Ilhan Omar and the DFL: Insights from Eight Years of Election Results (Pt 1)

About this Series

There are two accepted truths held by many in Minneapolis politics. One is that campaigning on an agenda that emphasizes identity politics and opposition to the police will increase voter turnout and motivate voters on the left to turnout. The second is that Congresswoman Ilhan Omar has successfully used these and other issues to motivate a base of supporters in ways that she outperforms other Democrats in the polls. Yiscah Bracha’s six-part piece questions those two truths. She undertakes a detailed statistical analysis of Omar’s election results, finding that she underperforms compared to other Democrats and in fact her candidate strategy may actually discourage some form voting. Bracha’s analysis is a definite read and it (along with my column) raises important questions about politics, issues, and voting as we head into the 2025 Minneapolis elections.

– David Schultz, Editor-In-Chief

Overview and History

As Democrats across the nation argue about why Trump won, and what they should do to “win back the working class”, in Minneapolis, on November 26, Ilhan Omar shared her proposition with the Minnesota Star Tribune:

“… Asked if the Democratic ticket did enough to court progressives, she said that more outreach, more policy signals and more understanding of progressive priorities “would be helpful in us winning.” The Harris-Walz campaign could have listened more to the Democratic base…”

Ilhan Omar has been the US House Representative for Minnesota Congressional District 5 (CD5) since January 2019.  CD5 includes Minneapolis, and suburbs to the south, west and north.  It is one of the most reliably Democratic districts in the US.  The Star Tribune not inaccurately described Ilhan Omar as “… the face of the Progressive movement”.  As the face of The Movement, presumably Ilhan Omar was doing everything that she exhorted the Harris-Walz ticket to do, and the result?

In the 2024 General Election (GE24), in CD5, Ilhan Omar got nearly 32k fewer votes than Harris-Walz.  Her under-performance compared to Harris was the largest of any Democratic House incumbent in the country.  She did even worse compared to Klobuchar, more than 33k fewer votes.  She did worse than the DFL candidates for State House in CD5; collectively they received 14k more votes than she.

Ilhan Omar occupies the CD5 seat largely because, when it opened in 2018, DFL leaders elevated her above other candidates who, by conventional metrics, were better qualified than she[i]. DFL leaders have intervened ever since to maintain her elevated status, although she never has secured widespread, durable voter support. Here is Ken Martin, DFL State Chair, not in 2018 with Trump less than two years into his provocative first term, but in May 2024, with Omar in office for more than five years, yet still struggling to defeat primary challengers: “In such a critical year we need everyone standing behind Ilhan and continue to support and lift her up.”

Three intertwined theories may explain why party leaders intervene on Omar’s behalf:

1. In 2018, “identity politics” raged. Young people especially strove to claim identities for themselves, and proudly proclaimed them as signifiers.  In politics, the influential 2002 book, The Emerging Democratic Majority, had stimulated a belief among both Democrats and Republicans that Demography was Destiny: Components of the Democratic coalition were projected to grow demographically, which eventually would produce a durable Democratic majority.  But leaders were required.  Barack Obama led nationally, and his historic election in 2008 seemed to validate the book’s thesis.  DFL leaders needed an Obama for the state.  Ilhan Omar satisfied the identity requirements:  A Muslim, woman-of-color immigrant.  CD5 loathed Trump, and by embodying everything Trump attacked, Omar was the antidote.  Party leaders elevated Ilhan Omar and have continued to elevate her because she is “The Face of the Progressive Movement”.  Which leads to Theory 2…
2. Although the “Progressive Movement” is not now a majority within the DFL, nor anything close to a majority among the Minnesota electorate, it is a large and growing force in Minneapolis. To win the state, the DFL needs Minneapolis to produce enough votes to offset growing losses in rural areas and small towns, so the DFL needs “Movement” votes.  As the face of The Movement, Ilhan Omar can secure those votes, which leads to Theory 3…
3. Ilhan Omar delivers votes for DFL statewide candidates. Here is Ken Martin, DFL State Chair, in August 2022:  “Her district is the engine of Democratic wins for the state of Minnesota. Omar has turned her campaign into a turnout machine for Democrats up and down the ballot”.    And here he is in July 2024:   “I know I can trust her to turn out DFL voters for our statewide candidates.” The party must lift her up because from that position, she already has produced massive votes for DFL statewide candidates, and she will continue to produce those votes.

In November 2024, the identity-based Democratic coalition shattered.  Cracks had been evident for some time.  Ruy Teixeira, co-author of the seminal 2002 book which had predicted the emergent Democratic majority, already had warned that working class voters were fleeing the party, repulsed by the party’s sociocultural leftward tilt driven by young activists and “professional-class hegemony”.   Trump in 2024 exploited their flight:  He made inroads with almost every identity-based group that Democrats had assumed were theirs, including young people, African Americans, Latinos, Asian-Americans, women.

As we will show, these national patterns materialized locally, in Minnesota, in CD5, in Minneapolis.  In CD5, Trump’s vote share from GE20 declined in the suburbs, while improving in Minneapolis.  Trump’s vote share improved most in Minneapolis wards where Ilhan Omar is most popular.  As Omar’s votes approached those for Harris, the DFL-over-GOP Presidential vote margin declined; Omar improved at the expense of the DFL.  Where the “face of the Progressive movement” was most prominent, the DFL lost its edge.

After six GEs with Omar on the CD5 ballot, it now is clear that she never has produced votes for statewide DFL candidates.  We will show that:

• Omar never has “turned out” votes. In Minneapolis wards where Omar is most popular, turnout patterns were the same before and after 2018.  The suburban municipalities where Omar is least popular vote more consistently, and at higher rates, than the Minneapolis wards where Omar is most popular.
• There is an inverse association between Omar’s popularity and the number of ballots cast. This pattern first emerged in 2016[ii] and has been replicated since: Ilhan Omar is most popular in Minneapolis precincts which vote the least.
• Candidate Average Votes (CAV) is a metric that captures support for a party’s candidates in the top five races over two consecutive GEs. There is no association between DFL CAV and Omar’s popularity.
• In recent memory, nobody occupying the CD5 seat has under-performed like Ilhan Omar. Her lost votes mostly go to Republicans.  In November 2024, the DFL-over-GOP CAV vote margin for the state was a comfortable 215k votes.  If top-ticket DFL candidates behaved like Ilhan Omar, and were rewarded with her votes, that margin would shrink to a more precarious 89.1k.  If, in addition, top-ticket GOP candidates behaved like Omar’s GOP competitors, the GOP would enjoy a CAV margin over the DFL of nearly half a million votes.

Both theory and evidence suggest that “The Progressive Movement” is driving voters away from Democrats nationally and locally.  If “The Movement” repels more voters than it brings, then Ilhan Omar, as Movement Face, is a DFL liability.  And if Ilhan Omar is a DFL liability, then by propping her up, DFL leaders have been committing slow political suicide.

Since 2016, DFL leaders have spun myths about Ilhan Omar to justify their interventions on her behalf.  This year, those myths collided with harsh reality.  Governor Walz, fresh off the campaign trail as hopeful VP, refused to comment on Omar’s complaint, that he and Harris failed to court “Progressives”, and that if they had, “… it would be helpful in us winning …”.  His refusal marginally acknowledged reality.  Whether he and other party leaders continue to acknowledge reality remains to be seen.  But if they decide to perpetuate myths, it cannot be said that they did not know.  They know.  The evidence is here.

[i] It could be said that Ilhan Omar occupies the CD5 seat because in 2017, Governor Mark Dayton got cancer.   Had Dayton not developed cancer, he might have run for another term as Governor in 2018, but because he did not, the state’s top seat opened, which prompted musical chairs below.  With less than two days before the filing deadline for the August primary, Lori Swanson, then Attorney General (AG), filed not for another term as AG but rather to compete in the DFL primary for Governor.  That opened the AG seat.  With less than one day remaining before the deadline, Keith Ellison, then CD5 US House Representative, filed not for another term in the US House, but rather to compete in the DFL primary for AG.  That opened the CD5 seat.  With only hours remaining before the filing deadline, six candidates filed for the CD5 DFL primary, including Ilhan Omar.

By any conventional metric, Ilhan Omar was least qualified.  All other candidates seeking the CD5 seat had served more years in office and had earned many more lifetime votes in competitive elections. Unlike Omar, all had been elected to leadership roles by their colleagues, and all had genuine legislative accomplishments.  They included Margaret Anderson Kelliher, Patricia Torres Ray, Bobby Joe Champion: Politicians with stature then and now.

If she was least qualified, why and how did she win?  Veteran DFLers quietly tell the same story:  Keith Ellison wanted her as his successor because he wanted another Muslim in the seat, and other prominent DFL leaders agreed.  They were proud to have sent the first Muslim to Congress; CD5 was “The Muslim Seat”.

They hastily arranged an endorsing convention, although none had been planned, because until these last-minute musical chairs, everyone had expected 6-term incumbent Ellison to run again.  They arranged that convention so that Ilhan Omar would emerge from it with the party’s endorsement, which in DFL-dominated CD5, is so valuable that it is almost equivalent to the seat.  If today’s DFL veterans are correct, Keith Ellison and other DFL leaders gifted Ilhan Omar with the DFL endorsement, which severely handicapped all other candidates competing in the DFL primary, and in DFL-dominated CD5, winning the DFL primary means winning the seat. In other words, in May 2018, DFL party leaders used endorsement proceedings to gift the seat to Ilhan Omar.

[ii] Ilhan Omar became an international sensation when, in 2016, she won the DFL primary for State House District LD60B, besting 40-year incumbent Phyllis Kahn and Somali candidate Mohammed Noor.  Reporting at the time emphasized her unique personal story, and how, with her expected victory in the GE, she would make history as the first Somali American in the nation elected to a state legislature.  Reporting also expressed awe in her organizational strength, and claimed that she and her army of volunteers had engaged many new voters and with them had built a “vast and diverse coalition”.

She did have a unique personal story that appealed to many voters, and she did make history as a demographic first.  And she did have a well-organized group of volunteers.  But the data show no evidence that she engaged new voters, or that she built a “vast and diverse coalition”, or that it was a “… very broad cross-section of the community…”

The data from that primary show that Omar won 2,404 votes, from 11.5% of the District’s registered voters.  Her 2,404 votes were a 41% plurality; 59% of those voting chose someone other than she, splitting the non-Omar vote almost equally.  Mohammed Noor won the precincts populated primarily by Somali-Americans (Cedar-Riverside and northern Seward).  Kahn won the precincts populated mostly by white liberal homeowners (southern Seward and Prospect Park).  Neither won many votes in the other’s turf.  Omar threaded between them, coming in 2^nd in precincts that went first for Noor or Kahn.

Precincts won by Noor and Kahn produced 77.5% of the votes.  Omar won precincts that produced 22.5% of the votes.  These precincts were on or around the east bank campus of the University of Minnesota, covering on-campus and off-campus student housing.  Brian Rice (longtime political operative and adviser to Kahn), “… credits Omar for bringing out several hundred more students …” And “The campaign had long planned to use e-mails, social media and phone reminders to mobilize students to vote, in an effort to offset the reality that the primary would take place while school was out.”

The data do not support these claims.  In the three precincts containing student housing, 352 voters cast ballots, 1.8% of those registered.   If Omar’s campaign had prompted them to vote from a distance, there should have been many absentee ballots on her behalf.  There were not.  Two precincts contributed 73.3% of all absentee ballots; they gave 58.8% of their votes to Mohamed Noor, and 31.6% to Ilhan Omar.

Ilhan Omar won this low-turnout State House primary because she had some cross-over appeal while Noor and Kahn had none.  Her small number of student voters put her over the top.  As with future elections, she was most popular in the precincts that voted the least.  She did not turn out low-voting students on her behalf; less than 2% of registered students cast ballots.

Ilhan Omar and the DFL:  Insights from Eight Years of Election Results (Pt 1)

Pt 2: Omar’s impact on the 2024 Presidential race in CD5

Pt 3: Ilhan Omar does not produce votes for statewide DFL candidates

Pt 4: lhan Omar portends a DFL vote margin collapse

Pt 5: Why is Omar’s comparative performance so poor?

Pt 6: What should the DFL do?